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ABSTRACT:
Creating a synergy of effort amongst the nearly innumerable agencies involved in a contingency operation is one of the challenges of the operational theater commander, which makes his selection an essential element of mission success within a theater of operations. This paper argues that because of the rare opportunities that exist to command at the operational theater-level of war, exposure to those serving in operational positions should be maximized prior to selection to command of an operational theater. Exposing potential leaders to this level may likely provide the otherwise unattainable experience required for successful completion of operational theater command. Failure to provide enough exposure to our potential future leaders to this level of command and to assess their likeliness for success in this area may result in poor execution of the military element of power and the overall poor integration of all elements of national power at the operational-level. No attempt is made herein to identify or address each of the intrinsic, obscure and immeasurable number of qualities that equate to either a successful or unsuccessful operational theater commander. This paper simply suggests that conducting a critical analysis of the experience of the leader and his exposure to the operational theater-level of war will likely add additional depth to the scrutiny required when selecting these senior military leaders. 
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INTRODUCTION
In a quest for a more agile, unconventional approach in an operational theater that has gone quickly downhill, on The argument of this paper is organized in the following manner. First, the terms exposure and experience are defined and their importance discussed relative to previous successful and relieved commanders of operational theaters. This is followed by a discussion of the different types of exposure, which for the purposes of this argument, are direct and indirect. To offer a potential counter argument to this argument, this paper will then examine the possible relationship between successful U.S. Presidents and the amount of political experience they possessed prior to assuming that office. Lastly, conclusions and recommendations are provided to support the thesis of this paper. ). 9. Use of the gender-specific pronoun "his" here is intended to avoid pronoun point of view confusion throughout this paper. The point of view of this paper is from the masculine, but obviously, an operational commander could also include the feminine.
EXPOSURE & EXPERIENCE
It is reasonable to assume that only by actually occupying a position or billet, can one truly gain "experience" at that specific job skill. Positions that demand this specific requirement are rare, but include such things as the Presidency of the United States, a firsttime mother, or an operational theater commander engaged in combat operations. President William J. Clinton, when asked about his wife"s level of experience to be President quipped that, "You could argue that no one is ever ready to be President. What is similar about all three of these commanders is that, in comparison to more successful commanders at the same level of command, they had little previous exposure and experience to the type of command they assumed. Table 1 compares the career paths of two successful and two unsuccessful officers who served in operational theater command. Study of the table suggests a pattern between their previous experiences, the amount of exposure that experience provided and their likelihood of successful service in command of an operational theater of war. Clearly, comparison of only four officers throughout American military history is perversely small. As well as is the disparity of the operating environments between the American Civil War, WWII and today"s conflict. However, for the scope of this paper, a pattern clearly emerges between service in direct observation of an operational theater commander (exposure) and the future success of these specific officers.
What this suggests is that experience and exposure, by both syntax and understanding, are very closely related. For the purposes of this argument, they are again closely linked; however, the subtle differences between them go a long way toward explaining the disparity between the performances of senior leaders. Exposure conveys a measure of experience in that the results and ordered effects of decisions are visible to those intimate with a situation and lessons learned may be garnered by a person exposed to them.
The 18
th Century Prussian Philosopher Immanuel Kant wrote extensively on this subject, asking if an object can be known to have certain properties prior to the experience of that object. 13 Specifically, he states, "…it follows from this that it is possible that there are objects of such nature which the mind cannot think, and so the principle of causality, for instance, cannot be applied outside of experience: hence we cannot know, for example, 
TYPE OF EXPOSURE: DIRECT
Direct and indirect are the two types of exposure addressed in this paper. Direct exposure is the easier of the two to define and the easier of the two to conceptualize as potentially enhancing the qualities of successful operational theater-level commanders.
Direct exposure is the first-hand witnessing of an event, decision, process, consequence, ordered effect or reaction as it occurs. Because of the construct of military staffs and the filtering brought about through the process of vetting lessons learned by witnesses, direct exposure to operational theater command should only be assumed when a person is actually assigned to an operational theater staff that is forward deployed and executing an operation or campaign. In other words, having direct access to daily decisions and influences incurred by the operational theater commander is useful because often times many lessons are hidden, 1988, 32-61, 79-80. assumed that leaders exposed to the operational theater-level may better understand the functional requirements of a theater of operations. General Petraeus" direct exposure in several situations displayed in Table 1 directly contributed to his education and suggests, without discounting his obvious and considerable intellectual skills, that someone exposed to the same experiences may perform on a par at the operational theater-level. This interaction may be the most effective way to prepare future operational theater commanders because, while they do not feel the same pressure as the commander, they see in real-time, the challenges of the position. Direct exposure is invaluable and, again, should only be assumed when someone is actually forward deployed and acting in an operational capacity. Assignment to a forward deployed operational theater staff, however, is not an opportunity that is available to all personnel and is often a matter of good timing. In the event that direct exposure is not possible, indirect exposure may lend nearly equally valuable lessons learned. The challenge of indirect exposure is that it puts the onus of synthesizing information into knowledge solely in the hands of the recipient. In other words, when directly exposed, the events happen right in front of the observer; with indirect exposure the person that wants the knowledge must actively seek it, critically consume it and glean lessons learned without the benefit of immediate feedback on the success or failure of the theater commander"s actions.
An example of this is indirect exposure through education. As the quote from John Tosh above exposes, history has always been a window to the future. Education has always played an essential element in the development of the way officers think about and execute warfare. History, theory and practical but "consequence free" mistakes performed in the colleges and universities-it is critical that they understand what it is they are studying. That may seem obvious on the surface, but the process of linking exposure to experience and linking experience to successful operational theater command is found in the assimilation of information into knowledge-something not always evaluated as a requirement for graduation or promotion.
Indirect exposure is also formed when senior officers looking to be assigned operational theater command, or officers currently serving in that role, take the time to observe the impact of their decisions on the military personnel executing their operational design. General Wass de Czege alluded to this form of exposure as well when he stated that, "Counterinsurgencies benefit when the vision from the top is continually challenged by the view from the bottom. Best results occur when colonels get around to talk to company commanders…corps commanders talk frequently to brigade commanders and so on…The exchange of views over this helps them both discover and then work the right one. The visiting higher commander can learn more details about the relevant forces and factors at work in his bigger AOR. This then will lead to a better problem framing at his level…"
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This form of indirect exposure cultivates an exchange from which counterinsurgencies certainly benefit. Arguably however, the commander"s design of the counterinsurgency and understanding of his decisions at all levels of his operational theater command has an experience forming effect as well.
There is no "cook book" for constructing operational theater commanders. However, when looking at previous successful commanders it appears that one possible equation is:
Education plus previous experience equals preparation. Education in this form refers to a operational theater commanders will likely have value, but should not be at the expense of Service identity and tactical success. Table 2 provides a potential argument that experience as a whole is bunk and adds very little to the scrutiny required to select senior leaders or commanders.
PRESIDENTIAL COMPARISON: ARGUING THE ARGUMENT
Regardless of the potential political opinion and controversy that perpetually surrounds this sort of data, for the purposes of this paper, the rankings in Table 2 are truncated for brevity and are secondary to the un-debated amount of experience that each of these Presidents had prior to assuming the arguably most powerful office in the World.
33 Surprisingly, what The counter to this, however, is that a certain amount of indirect exposure to the influence of Presidential decisions is inescapable by most citizens. Additionally, the gifted citizen who has even a glimmer of political ambition will likely have an above average attentiveness to Presidential actions. Table 2 displays only some forms of direct exposure, and does not address the indirect exposure that would possibly be derived from Abraham
Lincoln"s profession of law, or the leadership lessons garnered by Dwight Eisenhower in his life-long profession of arms. While on the surface this data appears to pull away from the argument that experience matters, it may, upon deeper inspection, strengthen the position. Table 2 suggests that combining recognized superior performers-like those that achieve the senior ranks in the military-with those that have at a minimum indirect exposure to the impact of senior level decision makers may produce individuals posited to produce effective results.
CONCLUSION
Research collected in support of this paper enhances the assertion that a combination of both indirect-suggested here to include both education and previous duty in a complex tactical environment-and direct exposure may equal a degree of experience that points to successful performance as an operational theater commander. Further, this paper has presented arguments for the addition of exposure and experience to the catalog of longaccepted qualities of military leadership utilized to identify tactical leaders for service as operational theater commanders. Arguments presented in this paper demonstrate that because of the scarcity of opportunities to command at the operational theater-level of war, the amount of exposure and experience of those selected to operational theater command should be maximized prior to their selection.
Though a potential formula has been offered, what this paper has not attempted to do is reduce the very difficult decision of selecting operational theater commanders to a process of identifying who does or does not have the most exposure and experience. Clearly the challenge of selecting these commanders remains incredibly complex, includes risk and consequences, and should not be diminished to a formulaic and impersonal process. Offered here is purely raw material for further study in search of the alchemy that produces leaders capable of conducting successful operations in support of U.S. strategic aims.
RECOMMENDATIONS
The subject of experience and exposure and their relationship to identification of successful operational theater commanders is non-scientific. That is to say that quantifying a quality is certainly a difficult task that has been examined since the earliest evaluationshow to identify, categorize, weight and evaluate what someone means when they say, "He just has "it", whatever "it" is." Though the discussion of this paper has centered on the potentially obscure qualities required for success at the senior operational levels of the military, there are some material recommendations that can support the difficult process of selection faced by strategic leaders.
First, because of the rarity of operational theater experience, the senior political and military leaders that choose operational theater commanders should look at the additional indicators of exposure and experience when considering selection to operational theater command. These indicators are likely contained in the records of military commanders but may not be obvious. While Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) has come a long way in meeting the requirements of the Goldwater-Nichols act of 1986, more needs to be done to recognize the extent to which an officer has achieved these two additional qualifiers.
A mandatory narrative comment in each of the Service"s standard evaluations that includes experience and exposure (with expanded definitions beyond this paper) to operations or duty in a complex environment as well as education may make these criteria more measurable.
This narrative should utilize a common language developed by the Joint Staff to identify leadership potential and ability to frame complex issues and develop workable solutions.
Second, as a concrete step in forming joint qualified officers, the Joint Staff should develop a Joint Fitness Report for use when an officer is assigned to a Joint Command. Too many times reporting officers are forced to fumble through a Service"s standard form having no idea the impact of their comments. Every Service has ubiquitous but unwritten rules which when unintentionally violated can have a disastrous impact on an officer"s career. A Joint Fitness report assumes that every evaluating officer learns the reporting process upon arrival at the command and "levels the playing field" for evaluation. These evaluations would become a part of an officer"s record and would be briefed via a Joint Precept at each Service-specific Title 10 promotion board.
Finally, General Scales is spot on with his assessment that education must not stop at any point in an officer"s career. 34 For Marines, attendance at the College of Naval Warfare is institutionally referred to as Top Level School (TLS). It is referred to in this manner because it is the final formally structured military school available to officers-many of whom are junior grade lieutenant colonels with many years of service remaining. Continued
Professional Military Education past TLS is essential to developing and identifying potential successful operational theater commanders or for identifying principle staff officers that serve at the highest command levels. A Senior course in Operational to Strategic bridging would likely be an energizing step toward further developing a pool of professionally prepared officers for duty in these critical billets.
34. (Scales 2009) 
